Earlier this year, the question wasn’t whether Democrats would suffer brutal losses in the midterm elections, but rather, how brutal the defeats would be. Those assumptions have changed quite a bit in recent months, thanks in part to circumstances, and in part to shifts in national polls.
After all, President Joe Biden’s approval rating has improved, and ample survey data suggest Democratic prospects in the Senate and House are considerably better than they were just three months ago.
It was against this backdrop that The New York Times’ Nate Cohn published a much-discussed report yesterday, making the case that Democratic optimism — or related Republican despondency — might very well be misplaced. The problem is that polling understated GOP support in the most recent election cycle, and that same problem may be understating GOP support now.
That warning sign is flashing again: Democratic Senate candidates are outrunning expectations in the same places where the polls overestimated Mr. Biden in 2020 and Mrs. Clinton in 2016.
The Times’ David Leonhardt wrote a related piece yesterday, emphasizing the same point.
Recent polls suggest that Democrats are favored to keep control of the Senate narrowly, while losing control of the House, also narrowly. But the Democrats’ strength in the Senate campaign depends partly on their strength in some of the same states where polls exaggerated Democratic support two years ago….
There is no doubt that both of these analyses are rooted in fact. In 2020, polling exaggerated Democratic prospects in battleground states such as Wisconsin and Ohio, and Democratic optimism about this year’s elections have been buoyed by data from states such as Wisconsin and Ohio.
You don’t need a PhD in political science to connect the dots here: It’s best not to rely too heavily on data from states where the data was recently wrong.
But — and you had to know a “but” was coming — there’s a detail that’s too easily overlooked: When looking at models and forecasts, it’s best to rely on apples-to-apples comparisons as much as possible.
The Times’ Maggie Haberman, for example, reflecting on Cohn’s report, noted that some pollsters have privately conceded of late that “in both presidential cycles [in 2016 and 2020], the races broke for [Republicans] after polling suggesting otherwise.”
That’s true. But it’s also true that this isn’t a presidential cycle; it’s a midterm cycle.
Republican arguments aren’t wrong about surveys understating Donald Trump’s support in both of the two most recent presidential elections: Pollsters, for a variety of complex reasons, missed a lot of the Republican’s voters, which led to plenty of surprises.
The fact remains, however, that midterm electorates tend to be qualitatively and quantitatively different from presidential election electorates — and Trump won’t be on the ballot in 2022 (at least not in a literal sense).








