Iran’s leaders messed up. They planned for a possible Israeli attack, but wrongly assumed it could come if June 15 nuclear talks with the United States failed. They interpreted the news that Israeli strikes were imminent as mere leaks to generate leverage for negotiations, so they spent the night of June 12 at home. Then Israel attacked, killing some Iranian leaders, including the three highest ranking generals.
That suggests a larger possible misconception — that Israel is primarily concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, and launched this campaign to curb it. But Israeli rhetoric and actions appear broader, aimed at regime change.
And even if that’s not what Israel intends, if this conflict doesn’t end soon, it could spiral into a regime-change war involving the United States.
Israeli rhetoric and actions appear broader, aimed at regime change.
After the first wave of strikes, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the Iranian people, denouncing “the Islamic regime, which has oppressed you for nearly 50 years,” and explaining that Israel is “clearing the path for you” to overthrow it. A day later, Netanyahu announced “we will strike every site and every target of the Ayatollah’s regime.” Israel correspondingly expanded their attacks to include Iran’s oil and gas industry, hitting fields and refineries.
That doesn’t look like an effort to curb a nuclear program. Against Iraq in 1981, and Syria in 2007, Israel bombed reactors under construction. Iran’s program is more advanced and would take more to destroy it, but doesn’t require trashing oil infrastructure or encouraging the people to rise up.
It doesn’t look like Israel’s previous aerial exchanges with Iran either. Direct fire first occurred last year, after Israel bombed an Iranian diplomatic compound in Syria, an escalation aimed at countering Iranian support for Hezbollah. Iran fired drones and missiles at Israel, which Israel, the U.S. and allies almost entirely shot down. Then Iran fired about 200 ballistic missiles, some of which got through, and Israel retaliated by using a stealthy weapon to bomb a radar station deep in Iran.
Israel could have interpreted that as establishing deterrence — basically “you can’t really get to us, but we can get to you” — especially since Iran subsequently stood by as Israel devastated Hezbollah last fall. But apparently Israel took it as indication Iran was vulnerable, and they should attack.
More than anything, the current campaign looks like Israel’s previous assaults on terrorist groups, with covert operations and airstrikes targeting leadership and assets. A main reason Israel can attack Iran now is its successful campaign against Hezbollah means Iran-supplied rockets aren’t flying in over its northern border like in 2023-24.
But Iran is a state, with political leadership, making the assassinations of military leaders less significant. Quickly losing the top military brass isn’t nothing, but the next generation moves up, the bureaucracy adjusts.
Iran hawks in Israel and the U.S. have advocated regime change for years — including when diplomacy had checked Iran’s nuclear program — claiming the government is fragile and would fall apart if pushed. That recalls the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and promises Iraqis would “greet us as liberators,” with longtime regime change advocates selling war as not just necessary, but easy.
Whatever happens, it won’t be easy. Iranians could experience a surge of nationalism. Some might not like their government, but that doesn’t mean they like Israel.
Israel conducted multiple air campaigns against Hamas since the group took over Gaza in 2007, but none weakened its grip on power. Israeli strategists recognized that, using the crude metaphor “mowing the grass” to describe the effectiveness of their air assaults on Hamas targets. It wasn’t a solution, it was maintenance, conducted under the presumption they’d have to do it again after Hamas’ military capacity “grew back.”
If the Iranian state collapses, that doesn’t mean it’ll be replaced by something better.
That failed with devastating consequences, as Hamas’ Oct. 7 attacks and Israel’s war in Gaza have since demonstrated. And there’s no way to do it with Iran. Israel’s current campaign gives the Islamic regime a powerful incentive to rush for nukes. After all, no one, including the United States, launches attacks on North Korea the way Israel has in Iran.
If the Iranian state collapses, that doesn’t mean it’ll be replaced by something better. It might not be replaced by anything other than a chaotic vacuum. It took years of U.S.-led occupation to stabilize Iraq after overthrowing Saddam Hussein.
If the regime survives, they’d be weaker but could rebuild, with China and India buying Iranian oil. There’d be nothing to prevent Iran from going nuclear.
Except the United States. If Israel stops soon, there might be an off-ramp. But if they follow through on Netanyahu’s rhetoric, yet don’t collapse the regime, Iran hawks will try to pressure President Donald Trump to “finish the job.” For now, Iran is absorbing a lot of damage, and getting some ballistic missiles through Israel’s air defense. If fighting stops soon, that’s probably enough to save face. But if Israel keeps attacking, the government could see it as a truly existential threat, and undertake drastic action they feared to do otherwise. If anything hits U.S. assets — such as forces stationed in Bahrain, Qatar or Iraq — or disrupts global energy markets, America could respond and things could spiral. Perhaps the biggest risk is Iran-allied militias, the disparate groups that make up what they call the “Axis of Resistance.” Hezbollah may be severely weakened, but the Houthis in Yemen appear in solid shape, able to fire on Red Sea shipping and occasionally into Israel. Plus, various smaller groups remain active, such as Shia militias in Iraq and Syria. They might attack American targets, even if Iran doesn’t tell them to. During Trump’s first term, rocket fire from Iran-backed Iraqi militias set off a sequence that culminated in America killing Iranian general Qasem Soleimani and Iran’s first-ever missile launch directly at the U.S. military, which injured over 100. In early 2024, a drone from a Syrian militia killed three Americans service members near the Syria-Jordan border. Then-President Joe Biden faced calls to attack their Iranian sponsors, but limited retaliation to the militia. Will Trump show similar restraint? His record shows a lot of bluster and a desire to appear strong, but not much follow-through on force abroad, at least not when things get difficult. Trump launched an air campaign against the Houthis in March, only to back off two months later after accomplishing little. He favors Netanyahu, who is attacking Iran, and favors Russia’s Vladimir Putin, who is currently partnered with Iran. As of June 15, Trump was left saying “Iran and Israel should make a deal, and will,” as they kept firing at each other. America’s stance will likely be haphazard, which will only increase the chances someone miscalculates. Worse, regime change advocates could take advantage of Trump’s dithering and manage to create the circumstances that could drag the U.S. military into a wider global conflict, whose outcome would be far from certain.
Nicholas Grossman
Nicholas Grossman is a political science professor at the University of Illinois, editor of Arc Digital and the author of "Drones and Terrorism." 
