For 83 years, Dec. 7 has been remembered as a day of infamy. After this weekend, that day will have a new legacy — a day of freedom, as one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in modern history disappeared.
The liberation of Syria from the clutches of President Bashar al-Assad, after his family ruled the country for 50 years, is an unqualified good. How did it happen so quickly and so unexpectedly? And what comes next? I reached out to the New Yorker’s Anand Gopal, who has reported extensively from Syria over the past several years, to help make sense of the extraordinary events of the past two weeks.
According to Gopal, three external factors loomed large. Under Assad, Syria’s biggest regional benefactor was Iran, but since the Oct. 7 attacks, it has withstood Israeli military strikes and watched its Palestinian ally, Hamas, also weakened by Israel.
Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, had also been an important provider of military resources and fighting men for Assad — but the Islamic group has been severely diminished after weeks of Israeli attacks in Lebanon.
Finally, and perhaps most decisively, with Russia bogged down in Ukraine, Assad could no longer rely on Moscow’s direct military engagement in fighting the rebels, particularly Russia’s close air support that had become crucial for Syria’s army.
Perhaps the most striking thing about HTS, under Jolani’s leadership, is the group’s outreach to the international community.
However, perhaps the most critical factor was internal: the slow-motion decay of the Assad regime. Massive corruption, economic stagnation and the utter dysfunction of the government hollowed out the country and tested the loyalty of the military rank and file. When the rebels finally mobilized from their area of control and captured Aleppo, the country’s second largest city, on Nov. 29, the low morale of Syria’s army, combined with the lack of Russian air support, doomed Assad’s regime. Rather than fight for the country’s leader, government forces abandoned their posts — and, in some cases, also their uniforms and equipment.
Ironically, all this was happening at the same time there’d been a steady and slow move toward regional normalization. Just weeks ago, Assad attended a meeting of the Arab League in Saudi Arabia, a year after his Arab opponents had given back Syria’s seat in the organization.
Now he’s in Moscow, likely forever.
What comes next? Since the outbreak of civil war in 2011 — and even after Assad largely put down the rebel uprising — Syria has devolved into sectarian conflict.
Even before Assad’s fall, a host of rebel factions controlled much of the state’s territory, including the Syrian National Army, which is basically a Turkish proxy; the Syrian Democratic Forces, an American proxy consisting of Kurdish and Arab elements that controls around 30% of Syria’s territory; and now Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group responsible for the final nail in the coffin of the Assad regime. How these groups interact and cooperate (or don’t) will be crucial to Syria’s future.
Much has been made of the fact that HTS grew out of Al Qaeda’s Syria offshoot and that the United States has designated its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, a terrorist. But Jolani has gone out of his way to disown Al Qaeda, purge HTS of more extremist elements and publicly moderate his views.
Gopal, the New Yorker’s reporter, believes the ideological shift is “genuine,” and Jolani appears to be “very pragmatically minded.” Indeed, Jolani seems to be saying all the right things in the run-up to Assad’s fall and after the president’s flight to Moscow.
He’s beseeched his supporters to avoid reprisals against Assad loyalists and has consistently preached a message of unity, dignity, and justice. He’s even extended an olive branch to Syria’s Christian, Kurdish and Alawite minorities. The latter is most notable because, through the Assads, it was the Alawites that ruled Syria with an iron fist for the past five decades. Jolani has played things well so far, but the real work begins now. Gopal, who has watched HTS’s growth over the past several years, is less surprised by the group’s political and diplomatic success than its military capacity, which seemed to catch much of the world off guard as well. “They’ve thought about the politics of this in ways that are impressive,” he said. Indeed, after HTS’s takeover of Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city, in late November, the group immediately moved to establish security, protect civilians and provide basic services to the city’s residents. According to Middle East analyst Aaron Zelin, this is consistent with HTS’s rule in the parts of Syria they controlled before the events of the last few weeks. These governing efforts and outreach to civilians contrasts with the Islamic State, which seemed more interested in ideological purity than institution building. Perhaps the most striking thing about HTS, under Jolani’s leadership, is the group’s outreach to the international community. “They are very serious about wanting rapprochement with the West and refashioning themselves as a national movement, not a transnational jihadist movement,” Gopal said. He noted that, usually, the prime audience for a rebel group is their domestic constituencies, but “HTS is different,” he said, adding, “They are attuned to the international community — and see it as a very important audience.” HTS has been in direct contact with Iran’s government and agreed to requests from Tehran to protect the country’s embassy and Shiite religious shrines. In addition, HTS has avoided antagonizing Russia, even going so far as to leave the country’s naval bases in Syria untouched. Jolani seems to recognize that he cannot afford to alienate the various external groups who have been meddling in Syria’s affairs during its bloody civil war — even those who have caused so much needless death and destruction. Whether Jolani and HTS stay on a moderate course remains to be seen. The potential for further sectarian conflict or score-settling is high. Moreover, there is always the possibility that Jolani is talking a good game but will change his stripes once HTS achieves power. Even in an ideal world, consolidating their rule, forming a stable, representative government, and ensuring harmony among Syria’s grab bag of militias and external actors are herculean tasks. Jolani has played things well so far, but the real work begins now. The U.S. and the rest of the international community should offer its support to HTS and the new government taking root in Damascus while also holding the group’s feet to the fire when it comes to distancing from jihadists and upholding human rights. But patience is also required: Under Assad’s rule — and particularly since the 2011 civil war began — Syria has experienced untold suffering. Large swathes of the country lie in ruins, and millions of refugees have fled their homes. The economy is in tatters, and the Syrian people are impoverished and hungry. The trauma of those imprisoned and tortured by Assad’s henchmen — or have seen firsthand the destruction wrought by his soldiers — is profound. But after decades of darkness, the Syrian people are finally experiencing the first rays of freedom. The scenes on the streets of Damascus — and the elation of political prisoners freed from Assad’s hellish prisons — are wonderfully joyous. It is a moment for celebration and a reminder that the desire for freedom and recognition is unquenchable. Syria’s neighbors, along with the international community, must do everything they can to help the country stay on the right path.
Michael A. Cohen is a political writer and a fellow with the Eurasia Group Foundation. 
