President Joe Biden’s decision to drop his bid for re-election has sparked curiosity and hope among progressives and Arab Americans who were turned off by his support for and complicity in Israel’s brutal siege of the Gaza Strip. Many are wondering whether Vice President Kamala Harris, the front-runner to win the Democratic presidential nomination, may be more inclined than her boss to push back more forcefully against Israel and offer support to Palestinians.
It’s a tricky assessment to make, in no small part because Harris doesn’t have a deep background in foreign policy. Most of Harris’ career focused on law enforcement, and during her brief stint in the Senate she wasn’t a major foreign policy player. Her ill-fated 2020 presidential campaign focused mostly on buzzy domestic policy ideas. As vice president she did delve into foreign affairs and diplomacy, but her job wasn’t to craft major policy — it was to execute it.
Harris’ criticisms of Israel, while notable, have been modest in scope, and might appear stronger than they are because Biden has set such a low bar.
There are some small hints that Harris could be to the left of Biden on the issue. But there are also plenty of reasons to think she would approach the issue similarly to him, and that her divergence from Biden could come down to speech style rather than policy.
The case for Harris as being potentially more sympathetic to Palestinian interests is primarily based on subtle rhetorical signals. In March, Harris delivered a speech that included some of the most overtly critical statements about Israel’s operation issued by the Biden administration, acknowledging the situation in Gaza as a “catastrophe.” Moreover, that speech might have been even more pointed had it not been softened by her colleagues. NBC News, citing current and former officials, reported that “the original draft of her remarks was harsher on Israel in describing the dire humanitarian situation for Palestinians in Gaza and the need for more aid.” White House National Security Council officials reportedly “toned down” parts of her speech. (A Harris spokesperson at the time called the portrayal “inaccurate.”)
Later that month Harris said in an interview that she didn’t rule out “consequences” for Israel if it launched an invasion of Rafah, which was at the time a stronger warning to Israel than any Biden official had made to date. As Politico reported at the time, Harris “has consistently gone further than President Joe Biden by at least half a step” in her rhetoric criticizing Israel. And in an interview with The Nation, Harris at least came across as more specifically attentive to the suffering of Gazans — and U.S. protesters on their behalf — than Biden.
However, Harris’ criticisms of Israel, while notable, have been modest in scope, and might appear stronger than they are because Biden has set such a low bar. As independent journalist Spencer Ackerman has pointed out, in her March speech, Harris might have sounded more upset by the humanitarian horror show than Biden, but she refused to condemn or fully critique Israel’s policy that helped give rise to it: the collective punishment of Gaza by vastly restricting food, electricity and supplies in violation of international law. Harris’ Nation interview might have sounded humane, but she made no substantive policy statements and declined to clarify which, if any, protesters she felt were right. And Harris’ saying Israel might face “consequences” over Rafah was not a red line comment, and hardly guarantees that she has the resolve to confront Israel in a meaningful manner.
From the beginning of Israel’s response to Hamas’ Oct. 7 war crimes, the Biden administration has hinted that it could do something but has basically done nothing significant about it beyond private pressure — with the exception of a temporary pause on a shipment of some of the heaviest ordinance it sends to Israel.
The more one digs into Harris’ background, the case that she could be an agent of the status quo on Israel appears meatier than the case against. Her rhetoric on Israel has generally ticked all the conventional U.S. foreign policy establishment boxes, including emphasizing the “ironclad” nature of the U.S.-Israeli alliance and Israel’s right to defend itself. As a senator, she spoke twice at conferences held by the hawkish American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), pledged support for Israel’s security and described the bond between the U.S. and Israel as “unbreakable.” During her first AIPAC speech in 2017, she noted that her first act as a senator was to introduce a resolution condemning a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning Israel. Jeremy Scahill of Drop Site News recently wrote up a comprehensive evaluation of Harris’ policy record on Israel and described her as having “hardline” support for Israel, noting, among many other things, her co-sponsoring legislation in 2017 “condemning former President Barack Obama’s decision to abstain from vetoing a UN Security Council Resolution critical of Israel.”
In addition to Harris’ conventional pro-Israel positioning, her national security adviser, Phil Gordon, is reportedly likely to remain central to her foreign policy agenda. He is a longtime U.S. foreign policy establishment adviser, who seemingly aligns with a number of Biden’s views of Middle East policy.
When you put all this together, the picture emerges of a politician who, at least after Israel’s response to the Oct. 7 attacks, has a rhetorical tendency slightly to the left of Biden. But most of her public positions don’t suggest that she is ready to change the course of the U.S.-Israeli relationship in a substantial way, if at all. Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a seasoned former Middle East hand, summed up his assessment this way in a recent interview with NBC News: Her views on Israel are to the “left of what Biden is prepared to do but way to the right of those who argue we need to impose costs and consequences on Israel to make it clear we’re the superpower and they’re not.” Miller’s synopsis is a reminder that Harris’ rhetoric could cut both ways: it could signal openness to new directions, but it could also provide cover for business as usual. The one major X factor of Harris’ worldview is she is still a relative newbie in the world of foreign policy. Her worldview is still forming, and the world is changing. It is possible that Harris’ perception of Israeli policy — like many Americans’ — was changed by Hamas’ attacks or Israel’s response to them. While newness can make some politicians more conservative, still others might feel emboldened to shake up the status quo. Harris’ newness might, theoretically, make her more more receptive to left-wing pressure on the issue. That activism is already taking place — such as a recent statement by major unions calling on the U.S. to halt military aid to Israel. Some of it is likely to be on the way — such as widely anticipated pro-Palestinian protests at the Democratic National Convention. A sustained resurgence of effective pro-Palestinian protests could extract policy wins from Harris, whether on the campaign trail or during a potential presidency. Harris will most likely try to use use ambiguity and a light touch to work to her advantage. Without doing much, she can allow many progressives to project hope onto her as an alternative to the status quo. And without doing much, she can bank on most pro-Israel supporters of the Democratic Party, who’ll most likely assume she’s still on board with the Biden-Harris foreign policy they’ve come to expect. For now, Harris appears to be treading carefully. She won’t be presiding over or attending Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s controversial address to Congress on Wednesday, which a number of Democrats are boycotting. She will instead be on the campaign trail and is expected to meet with Netanyahu privately during his visit. It’s a perfect way for her to avoid any polarizing optics — or make clear to anyone exactly where she stands.
Zeeshan Aleem is a writer for MS NOW. Sign up for his newsletter. 
