The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, as well as its sponsors in Tehran, appears to be spiraling completely out of control. An all-out war is looming with Israel, whose government is flush with victory and triumphalism and in little mood to suspend its attacks as Iran and Hezbollah vow to fight on.
The Biden administration sought to limit the post-Oct. 7 crisis to a war in the Gaza Strip, and especially prevent it from spreading into Lebanon. The policy has fallen apart, with Israel having invaded Lebanon, continuing to batter Hezbollah with air attacks and, most dangerously of all, tit-for-tat missile attacks between Iran and Israel. At the time of writing, the region is bracing for Israel’s inevitable retaliation against Iran.
Yet, an all-out war on multiple fronts could still be avoided since there is an off-ramp for the warring parties.
How we got here
A mutual drawdown could center on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701, adopted in the aftermath of the last major Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006. The resolution holds that Hezbollah should withdraw its fighters and heavy equipment from the south of Lebanon up to the Litani River, about 25 km (roughly 15.5 miles) into the country.
An all-out war on multiple fronts could still be avoided since there is an off-ramp for the warring parties.
The resolution was accepted by Israel and the Lebanese government, but not formally by Hezbollah. Israel and Hezbollah settled into a “new normal” of routine clashes on both sides of the border limited to about a mile on either side, aimed at military targets and producing limited casualties.
This understanding persisted until last Oct. 7, when both sides’ attitudes changed. While it didn’t want a war with Israel, Hezbollah couldn’t remain completely passive and preserve its reputation as a “resistance” organization. So it increased rocket fire, initially within the accepted understanding. But for Israel, that was no longer acceptable. Oct. 7 prompted a new border security doctrine, rendering the presence of an Iranian-backed militia to its north strategically and, especially, politically intolerable.
Israeli leaders needed to inflict strategic costs on Iran and its network, which had benefited while paying almost no price from the Oct. 7 attack and its aftermath. They also sought to recuperate the legitimacy of Israeli security institutions through a clear-cut victory over a major enemy, which was not available in Gaza. Hezbollah was a more strategically significant and conventional target, offering credible metrics of victory.
Discussion about an invasion of Lebanon began as early as Oct. 12, 2023, pushed by Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. It was prevented by the Biden administration and the need to focus on Hamas. But as Israel began to run out of targets in Gaza, and Hezbollah’s cross-border attacks had intensified over time, attention began to turn north.
While Hezbollah and Iran definitely did not want a war to defend Hamas (an unreliable ally) or Gaza (a place of no strategic significance), even ambivalent Israelis could see potential advantages to expanding the conflict. This gave them near-absolute escalation dominance, and the ability to control the scope and pace of the conflict.
The ball is now firmly in Israel’s court, as heavy fighting continues in southern Lebanon and the air campaign against Hezbollah proceeds apace.
As the U.S. election loomed, with Israel enjoying maximum freedom of action and impunity from U.S. pushback, it began a series of major attacks designed to cripple Hezbollah. Targets included the assassination of many of its key leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, battlefield commanders, fighters and operatives, and heavy equipment including missiles and rocket launchers. Ignoring a week of U.S. efforts to organize a cease-fire, Israel suggested it would accept, it launched a major invasion of Lebanon’s south.
Throughout this process, Hezbollah pulled its punches, never unleashing its most powerful precision-guided missiles at the most sensitive and strategic Israeli targets, avoiding the Dimona nuclear reactor and population centers such as Haifa. Iran remained passive, with the exception of a failed drone response to an Israeli strike on the Iranian Embassy annex in Damascus that killed several high-ranking Iranian generals. That all changed Oct. 1 — when Iran unleashed its second significant missile barrage against Israel.
There is a way out
The ball is now firmly in Israel’s court, as heavy fighting continues in southern Lebanon and the air campaign against Hezbollah proceeds apace. Israel will certainly respond militarily to Iran’s attack, but much will depend on whether it attacks redline Iranian targets such as oil installations or nuclear facilities.
Many fear that Israel will seize the opportunity to launch a protracted air war against Iran that is intended to draw the U.S. into conducting a bombing campaign sufficient to knock Iran’s nuclear program back by a decade or more.
Virtually no one in the United States wants to be drawn into a major war with Iran, even on behalf of Israel, but the Israelis probably lack the conventional firepower to do the job for themselves.
Fortunately, there is an offramp. The Lebanese government, obviously acting pursuant to consultations with Hezbollah, is offering to implement 1701, with the militia pulling back and being replaced in the south by the Lebanese armed forces and U.N. observers. Riding a wave of wins, Israel’s ruling coalition may be in no mood to compromise. But sensible Israelis must realize that they are on the brink of being drawn into another prolonged occupation in southern Lebanon which would be the ideal context for Hezbollah to eventually rebuild its organization, power and legitimacy. Hezbollah would like nothing more than a return to the fight against Israel that began in 1982 when the organization was founded to combat Israeli occupation and culminated with Israel’s retreat in May 2000. In his final speech, Nasrallah said he would welcome an Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Many dismissed it as bluster but Nasrallah was almost certainly serious, given Hezbollah’s urgent need to recover and rebuild. Israel may be unwittingly handing them the opportunity to do that on their own terms. Sensible Israelis must realize that they are on the brink of being drawn into another prolonged occupation in southern Lebanon. Moreover, a war with Iran carries enormous risks, including the development of potentially serious resentment against Israel in the United States. It could sentence Washington to a prolonged pattern of routine bombing runs against Iran, just as occurred in the 1990s against Iraq. And Iran and Hezbollah both retain options, including more powerful missiles and the use of other proxies and even terrorists around the world to strike back. The danger of Israeli overreach, especially pursuing open-ended insurgencies to the north and south — and potentially one that appears to be brewing to the east in the occupied West Bank — is considerable. The deal would look like this: Hezbollah agrees to pull back fighters and heavy equipment to beyond the Litani River, to be replaced by Lebanese and U.N. troops. Hezbollah also ceases rocket fire against Israel, with both parties agreeing to decouple the Lebanon conflict from the Gaza war. This agreement would also allow Israel and Iran to stop their extraordinarily dangerous tit-for-tat exchanges and spare the region, and the U.S., from a multifront regional war and a direct U.S. military confrontation with Iran. Lebanon and Hezbollah seem willing to take this deal, and Washington is pushing it enthusiastically. Iran would surely welcome it to, as Hezbollah would not have greenlighted the Lebanese acting prime minister to make the offer without approval from Tehran. The main question is whether Israel’s government, with the wind at its sails, is in any mood to compromise. The Biden administration needs to remind Israel of the dangers of overreach, and potential for serious damage to bilateral relations if Israel is viewed as dragging the U.S. into another catastrophic “forever war” in the Middle East. Biden has already warned Israel not to make “the mistakes we made” after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The parallels are unnerving. A national trauma followed by deceptively easy early victories, as the U.S. experienced in Afghanistan and Israel thinks it has accomplished in Gaza, is the perfect setup for catastrophic overreach. Given the existence of an off-ramp, Iran and Hezbollah’s apparent willingness to take it, and the urgent need for Washington to avoid getting dragged into another madcap Middle East adventure, one of Biden’s most important final missions is to convince Israel to take a deep breath, and the deal, before it’s too late.
Hussein Ibish
Hussein Ibish is a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. 
The off-ramp from all-out war
